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STATEMENT OF WORK
PROBLEM STATEMENT
1.1 SCOPE
This document reports the results of a cooperative research program between Western Aerospace Laboratories, Inc. and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, titled "EVALUATING COMPONENTS OF THE T-NASA SYSTEM" The period of
performance covers August 1995 to October, 1996.
BACKGROUND
One of the goals of NASA's Terminal Area Productivity (TAP) program is to increase the efficiency of surface operations, so that
more ai;planes can move in and out of airports in a given time period. Two major elements of the program are to reduce runway
occupancy time and roll-out time by 20%, and to maintain VFR levels of performance in IFR (down to CAT IIIB [300 ft RVR])
visibility.
The only way to realize the second element is to augment the pilot's situation awareness during taxi operations. Currently, situation
awareness depends on what the pilot can see out of the windows, his or her experience with the airport, and Jeppesen paper maps.
Under low visibility conditions, the out-the-window scene is inadequate to support the operational objectives of the TAP program. To
take just oneexample, report number 464 in the ASRS data base on weather encounters documents a case where a pilot was
attempting to taxi under unexpectedly low visibility conditions (heavy fog). He reported his forward speed as "very slow", and he
confused the blue taxiway edge lights for the green taxiway center lights (the two colors became indistinguishable when reflected
through the fog). He attempted to follow what he thought were the center lights, and guided the aircraft offthe runway and onto a soft
shoulder. He eventually brought the aircraft back onto the runway and to the gate, but in a time frame that falls far short of the TAP
objectives.
PLAN FOR RESEARCH
The goals of the TAP program mandate a system that supplements the visual information available to the pilot in low visibility
conditions. The LOVLASO team has developed a traffic, navigation, and situation awareness (T-NASA) system that incorporates an
electr,.,mc map and head-up display (HUD) symbology. The research performed in FY 1996 was designed to evaluation of the separate
and joint effect of the two components (i.e., the HUD and the taxi map) on ground taxi performance. A full report of the simulation
tbtlows.
ABSTRACT
We report theresults of a part-task simulation evaluating the separate and combined effects of an electronic moving map display and
newly developed HUD symbology on ground taxi performance under moderate- and low-visibility conditions. Twenty-four
commercial airline pilots carried out a series of 28 gate-to-runway taxi trials at Chicago O'Hare. Half of the trials were conducted
under moderate visibility (RVR 1400 ft), and half under low visibility (RVR 700 ft). In the baseline condition, where navigation
support was limited to surface features and a Jeppesen paper map, navigation errors were committed on almost half of the trials.
These errors were virtually abolished when the electronic moving map or the HUD symbology was available; in addition, compared to
the baseline condition, both forms of navigation aid yielded an increase in forward taxi speed. The speed increase was greater for the
HUD than the electronic moving map, and greater under low visibility than under moderate visibility. These results suggest that the
combination of electronic moving map and HUD symbology has the potential to greatly increase the efficiency of ground taxi
operations, particularly under low-visibility conditions.
INTRODUCTION
One of the primary tasks facing tile pilot of an aircraft is navigation, the process by which the aircraft is guided from the departure
point to the correct destination. Currently, two navigation aids are available to pilots of glass cockpit aircraft: the typical horizontal
situation indicator or "HSI" display and, for aircraft equipped with Head-Up Displays (HUD), a head-up guidance system.
Ascurrentlyengineered,however,neithertheHSInorthehead-upguidancesystemsupportshetaskofnavigatingontheairport
surface.Forgroundoperations,navigationsupportisstilllimitedtopapermapsandsurfacef atures,uchassignsandtaxiwaylights.
Wayfindingusingpapermapsisahighlydemandingtask[1],particularlyatlarge,complexairports[2].Thedifficultyisexacerbated
still furtherundereducedvisibilityor instrumentmeteorologicalconditions(IMC).Thearchivesof NASA'sAviationSafety
ReportingSystemcontainumerousincidentsriggeredbypilotsbecomingdisorientedwhiletaxiingunderlow-visibilityconditions.
Theconsequencesofdisorientationincludedeviatingfromtheclearedroute,increasedinteractionwithATC,andconflictswithother
traffic.Inextremecases,routedeviationscanseriouslydisruptthetrafficpatternacrosstheentireairport.Forexample,amisplaced
aircraftrecentlyforcedtheclosingofarunwayforseveralhoursatChicagoO'Hare[3]. It isclearfromtheseincidentshatsurface
navigation,particularlyunderlowvisibility,posesamajorchallengetotheefficiencyofterminalareaoperations[4].
Overthenextdecade,airtrafficin theUnitedStatesisexpectedto increaseby50%.In response,NASAandtheFAAare
developinganumberof advancedtechnologiestoincreasethetraffic-handlingcapacityofexistingairports.Onesucheffortaimsto
increasetheefficiencyofsurfaceoperations,particularlyunderlow-visibilityconditions.HereatNASA-Ames,wearecurrently
developinganintegratedsystemof navigationaidswiththegoalto enablepilotstoachievetheleveloftaxiperformancenormally
seenundervisualmeteorologicalonditions(VMC)in IMC[5].
Fromahumanfactorsperspective,thefirststepindesigningsuchasystemisto identifytheinformationrequirementsof the
groundtaxitask[2]. Inparticular,weareinterestedinidentifyingtheinformationthatisacquiredfromtheout-the-windowscene;we
canthendesigndisplaystoprovidethisinformationwhenit isnototherwiseavailable(i.e.,inIMC).
Twocomponentsof thenavigationtaskaretypicallydistinguished,eachrelyingonadifferentsetof visualcues.Thelocal
guidanceomponent[1],makesuseof flowfieldcharacteristics,edgerateinformation,andthegeometricrelationbetweenthefocus
ofopticalexpansion(apointin thevisualfieldfromwhichtheopticalflowfieldappearstoradiate,indicatingtheaircraft'scurrent
heading;[6]). These optical cues control various actions (e.g., steering, throttle adjustments, braking) that move the aircraft through
the environment at a certain heading and a certain forward speed. The second task component, navigation awareness [1], involves the
identification Of relevant landmarks (e.g., signage, taxiway intersections, etc.) in order to maintain awareness of the aircraft's current
location with respect to the cleared route. Navigation awareness is necessary to ensure that the pilot makes correct decisions regarding
where and when to turn the aircraft.
ELECTRONIC MO V1NG-MAP DISPLAYS
Recent efforts to assist the pilot with ground navigation have focused on electronic moving map (EMM) displays, which depict the
current location of the aircraft on the airport surface and update the location in real time. If the EMM also contains a depiction of the
cleared route, a quick glance at the d.isplay is sufficient to assess the current position of the aircraft relative to the cleared route,
allowing the pilot to maintain a high level of navigation awareness. For our purposes, an additional important feature of the EMM is
that it provides navigation awareness without having to recognize landmarks in the out-the-window scene. Furthermore, by rotating
the map so that it is always aligned with the current heading of the aircraft, the EMM removes the need to cognitively "align" the ego-
referenced information in the out-the-window scene with the world-referenced information on standard paper maps [1]. Thus, not
only is information regarding navigation awareness provided by an EMM, it is provided in a form that greatly reduces the information
processing demands on the pilot [7].
Given these characteristics, one would expect ground taxi performance to improve when an EMM is introduced into the flight
deck, particularly under low-visibility conditions. A number of recent simulation studies have examined ground taxi performance
with and without an EMM [7][8][9][10]. Consistent with expectations, pilots did indeed make fewer navigation errors and taxi at a
greater speed when an EMM was present, compared to a paper-map only condition. These benefits were more pronounced in low than
in high visibility. Further, the benefits of the EMM were even greater when graphical route guidance was provided relative to a pure
positional display [7][11].
Electronic moving maps are not without their drawbacks, however. The typical EMM provides only a 2-D plan view of the airport
surface. This form of display can be used for local guidance at low-zoom levels, by keeping the ownship symbol aligned with the
route guidance line or taxiway centerline (assuming the EMM includes these features). However, a 2-D plan view is very dissimilar to
the out-the-window scene [9], where the cues that control local guidance are normally extracted. Thus, the standard EMM format is
not well suited to display local guidance information. In addition, several simulation studies have found that EMM usage increases
head-down time [7]; see also [12]. Ground taxi requires continuous interrogation of the out-the-window scene for traffic incursions
and other potential hazards, so any display that brings the pilot's eyes into the cockpit raises serious safety concerns [2].
HEAD-UP DiSPLAYS
These considerations suggest that further improvements in ground taxi performance could be obtained with a display that better
supports local guidance (cf. [13][14]. Wickens and Prevett [15] argue that the ideal local guidance display would provide the same
opticalcues,in thesamego-referencedforward-viewperspective,thatarenormallyextractedfromtheout-the-windowscene.If
suchadisplaywasalsohead-up,localguidancecouldbeachievedinan"eyes-out"mode,justasit isnormally.Guidedinpartby
theseconsiderations,werecentlydevelopedacandidates tofHUDsymbologytosupportgroundtaxi[16][17].ShowninFigure1,
thesymbologysetincludesaseriesof evenly-spacedtilesoverlayingthetaxiwaycenterline,andaregularly-spaceds riesof cones
stretchingalongeachsideoftheclearedtaxiway.Thesesymbolsare"scene-linked"suchthat,astheaircraftproceedsthroughthe
environment,thesymbolsundergothesameopticaltransformationsasif theywereactualobjectsplacedonthetaxiway[16].
Subjectively,thesymbologyresemblesavirtualtaxiwaylightingsystem,exceptthathelightsoutlineonlytheclearedroute.Thus,
theHUDsymbologysolvesbothshortcomingsa sociatedwithanEMM:It providesanaturalsetofopticalcuesto Supportlocal
guidance,anddoesoinaformthatallowspilotstoremaineyes-out.
JustastheEMMprovidesomesupportforlocalguidance,sotoodoesthecandidateHUDsymbologyprovidesomesupportfor
navigationawareness.BydisplayingtheclearedrouteasthehighlightedtaxiwaysontheHUD,theHUDsymbologyforms.avirtual
paththroughtheenvironment,yieldinga"preview"ofthedistancetoupcomingturnsandtheactualturnsthemselves.Navigation
accuracycanbeachievedbysimplyfollowingthevirtualpath.SimilartotheEMM,theHUDeliminatestheneedtoprocessreal-
worldlandmarksandcognitivelyreferencethemtoapapermap.However,giventhenarrowfieldofviewontheHUD,the"preview"
oftheclearedrouteismaximalonsectionsthatfeaturelongstraight-aways.Sincethesymbologyoverlaystheclearedroutedirectly,
thelengthofthevirtualpathdiminishesincurvedareas,anddisappearscompletelyonsharpturns.Thus,ourHUDsymbologydoes
notsupport(andwasnotdesignedtosupport)navigationawarenesstothesamextentasanEMM.
THE PRESENT STUD Y
The present research had three primary goals. One was to assess the benefits to ground taxi performance provided by the taxiway
HUD Another was to compare directl _erformance benefits associated with an EMM and the
Figure 1: Depiction of HUD taxi symbology over a generic taxiway. All HUD symbology shown in white (actually green).
taxiway HUD. The third goal was to compare the magnitude of the separate benefits provided by the two forms of navigation aid
against the benefits when both aids were available simultaneously. These comparisons are critical for establishing the usefulness of
HUD symbol0gy in an integrated system of ground navigation aids. EMM's are relatively inexpensive to integrate into current glass
cockpits, so their introduction into the next generation of commercial aircraft is virtually assured [2]. HUDs are much more expensive
devices. Thus, a critical cost/benefit comparison is between the size of the performance benefitfound with an EMM alone, compared
to an EMM plus the HUD symbology.
An additional aim of the present research was to determine whether the benefits associated with the different configurations of
navigation displays would increase as visibility was reduced. Such a pattern follows naturally from the fact that pilots can use out-the-
windowcuesto navigateunderhighvisibilityconditions.Underlowvisibility,however,thenormalout-the-windowscenecues
becomeunavailableorsharplydegraded,conceptuallyforcing reaterrelianceontheelectronicaids.
In additiontothesepurelyquantitativeissues,thereisconsiderabletheoreticalinterestin theformof theperformanceb nefit
associatedwiththetwokindsof navigationaids. Aswehaveseen,theHUDwasdesignedprimarilyto supportlocalguidance,
whereastheEMMwasdesignedprimarilytosupportnavigationawareness.A priori,it mightbeexpectedthatEMM'swouldhavea
largereffectonroute-followingaccuracythanonaspectsofperformancethatarecontrolledbylocalguidancecues,suchasforward
speed.TheoppositepatternofbenefitswouldbepredictedfortheHUDsymbology.
Finally,weexpectedtheresultsofthesimulationtoprovideadditionalinsightintothenatureofthegroundtaxitask.Forexample,
Batsonetal.[8]usedrootmeansquaredeviationsfromtaxiwaycenterlineastheprimarymeasureofroutefollowingaccuracy.From
thepilot'sperspective,however,groundtaximaynotbeconceptualizeda'satrackingtask,withthegoaltofollowthecenterlineofthe
taxiwayascloselyaspossible.Taxiwaysarewideenoughtopermitconsiderabled viationsfromcenterlineandstillremainwithin
safetaxiingparameters.Thus,oursimulationprovidedanopportunityodeterminewhetheroutenavigationaccuracy,ratherthan
absolutedeviationfromcenterlineis,infact,amoreappropriateerrormetricforthetask.
inadditiontotheempiricalmeasures,variousformsofsubjectivedatawerecollected.Sinceourelectronicnavigationaidsremove
theneedtoengageinvariouscognitiveprocessesa sociatedwithapapermap[1],weexpectedthenavigationdisplaystoreducepilot
workloadconsiderably.Toquantifytheexpectedreduction,pilotsratedtheworkloadoneachtrial. Wewerefurtherinterestedin
whetherworkloadreductionwouldvarybythetypeofnavigationaidavailable(EMMvs.HUDvs.both).
Aftercompletingthesimulation,eachparticipantfilledoutanextensivequestionnaire.Thequestionsprovidedanopportunityo
solicitpilotfeedbackonthetwonavigationaids,andtorecordpilotopinionsonthecomparativeefficacyofthetwodisplays.
PARTICIPANTS
Twenty-four highly-experienced male airline pilots participated in the study (mean hrs of flight time > 10000). Twenty-two were
currently occupying the position of Captain, and two of First Officer. Current aircraft type was distributed across B737, B747, B757,
B767, MDS0, and DC-10. Twenty-two of the 24 participants reported either high or moderate levels of experience with ground taxi.
In addition, 22 participants reported some experience flying in and out of Chicago O'Hare. Although many participants had logged a
'high number of hours in simulators, simulator experience with ground taxi was quite low (median = 3 hrs).
THE SIMULATION
Participants viewed a highly detailed out-the window scene of Chicago O'Hare from a simulated eye height of 16 feet (i.e., the eye
height of the B737 flight deck). The visual scene was driven by an SGI Onyx Reality Engine 2, rear-projected on an Electrohome
screen measuring 2.43 m (width) by 1.83 m (height). The screen image had a resolution of 640 by 512 pixels, and was updated at a
rate of 30 Hz. Participants were seated in a chair approximately 2.43 m from the screen. At this distance, the screen provided
approximately 53 deg of horizontal visual angle.
The HUD consisted of a semi-transparent silvered glass sheet (combiner) measuring 24 cm in height by 20.4 cm in width. The
combiner was oriented at an angle of 41 degrees down with respect to the observer, located approximately .30 m from the eye point,
and centered with respect to the wide screen. The HUD symbology was generated by an SGI Personal IRIS at an update rate of 8-12
Hz (depending on scene complexity), drawn on an XKD CRT monitor (1280 by 1024 pixels of resolution). The monitor symbology
was projected through a Fresnel lens and reflected into the participants' eyes through the combiner glass. All symbology was green
and appeared at a focal distance of 2.43 in. This ensured that the HUD symbology appeared at the same optical distance as the image
on the wide screem A portable metal frame housed and physically supported the CRT monitor and the combiner glass. On blocks of
trials where the HUD symbology was withheld, the frame was moved to one side of the room.
The HUD symbology is shown in Figure 1. The cleared route was depicted by vertical side cones on each side of the commanded
taxiway, as well as rectangular tiles overlaid on the taxiway centerline. Both forms of symbol were repeated every 15.2 meters down
the cleared route. Turn "countdown" warnings took the form of three rows of tiles beginning with the centerline tile and extending to
the right side of the taxiway (see Figure l). The initial row, located 46 m from the corner, contained 4 tiles (including the centerline
tile), the second row (30.5 m away) contained 3 tiles, and the third row (15.2 m away) contained 2 tiles. The sharpness of the turn was
depicted by a "turn sign" located just beyond the taxiway. The angle of the arrow drawn on the turn sign was veridical with the angle
of the turn. Finally, location and ground speed information were given in a non-scene-linked triangular "Past/Present/Future" format.
The central reference identified the taxiway/runway currently occupied by the aircraft; the lower left reference identified the taxiway
intersection just passed, and the lower right reference identified the crossing taxiway at the next intersection. Ground speed was
displayed digitally directly above the central reference.
The forward route was drawn according to the following algorithm. Each route was divided into segments whose length varied
according to the curvature of the route at that point. As the plane taxiied along the route, the symbology outlining the upcoming route
segmentwasdrawnontheCRT.At least300mbeyondtheparticipant'seyepointwasdrawnatalltimes.Onlong,straightsections
oftheroute,anupcomingsegmentcouldbedrawnwellbeforetheownshipreachedtheendofthecurrentsegment,extendingthe
routeoverlaywellbeyondthe300mminimum.
Note,however,thatalthoughaminimumof 300mof route-overlays mbologywasalwaysgeneratedbythecomputer,the
symbologywasnotalwaysvisibleonthecombinerglass.Sincethesymbologyoverlaidtheclearedrouteonly,it remainedinview
onlyaslongastheairplanewasalignedwiththeclearedroute.If thepilotcommittedanavigationerror,andstrayedoffthecleared
route,taxiways/runwaysintheforwardfieldofviewwerenothighlightedbyHUDsymbology.Furthermore,sincetheflightdeckof
theB737isc0nsiderablyforwardoftheplane'scenterofgravity,theclearedtaxiway(andoverlaidHUDsymbology)wasoftenoutof
rangeoftheforwardfieldofviewjustpriortosharpturns.
TheEMM,showninFigure2,wasdrivenbyanIBMpersonalcomputerquippedwithaPentiumprocessor,anddisplayedona
23-cmdiagonalCRTlocatedbelowandtotheleftoftheparticipanta adistanceofapproximately1m. Thedisplayconsistedofa2-
Dtrack-uplan-viewdepictionof ChicagoO'Hareairportthatcouldbeviewedatoneoffivezoomlevels•Thepilotcouldadjustthe
zoomlevelatanytimebyrotatingadiallocatedbelowtherightarmrest.InFigure2,theownshipsymbolcanbeseenalignedwith
therouteguidanceline.TheEMMwasupdatedatarateof6-8Hz,dependingonthecomplexityofthedisplay•Additionaldetails
concerningtheEMMdesigncanbetbund in [7].
The vehicle model emulated the handling characteristics of a B737. A combination of rudder and toe brakes were located below
the forward display area. The throttle was located on the surface of the right-side arm rest, and the nose wheel tiller, a joystick, was
located on the left-side armrest. Leftward steering was controlled by rotating the joystick counterclockwise, rightward steering by
rotating the joystick clockwise.
The simulation facilities were housed in a dedicated, darkened room. An experimenter station was located in a room adjacent to
the simulation facility. The station included three computer monitors, one displaying the current.out the-window view, one displaying
HUD s and one dis the EMM. ardless of what nav_ation aid, or
Figure 2: Electronic Moving Map, showing the ownship proceeding along the inner (Alpha) taxiway at Chicago O'Hare. The
ownship is following a cleared route starting in the ramp area adjacent to Concourse F and finishing at departure runway 14R. Gray
areas were green on map; the background in the left-hand clearance area and the route overlay line were blue.
combinationof aids,wereavailableto thepilot,all threedisplayswereavailableto theexperimenter.Thisallowedconstant
monitoringof thepilot'scurrentlocationandprogress.Inaddition,two-waycommunicationbetweenpilotandexperimenterwas
availableatalltimesviaanintercom.
METHOD
The experiment contained 28 trials, each consisting of a specified route that began in a ramp area adjacent to a terminal, and
finished when the airplane turned onto the departure runway. The routes averaged 1.7 nmi in length and took approximately 7 min to
complete. To avoid duplication, all major terminals and runways were utilized for route construction. The assignment of routes to
trials was random, and the same random order was maintained for each participant.
The experiment was divided into two blocks of 12 trials each. In the baseline block the only navigation aid provided was a
Jeppesen paper map of Chicago O'Hare. In the navigation aid-enhanced block, pilots assigned to the "EMM" group were provided
with the paper map and the EMM; pilots assigned to the "HUD" group were provided with the paper map and the HUD taxi
symbology; pilots assigned to the "EMM + HUD" group were provided with the paper map and both the EMM and the HUD taxi
symbology. For half of the participants, the first block of trials formed the baseline condition, and the second block formed the
navigation-aid enhanced condition; for the remaining participants, this order was reversed.
Of the twelve trials in each block, the first two were considered practice, and were not analyzed. In addition, considering the trials
sequence as a whole, trials 3, 7, 16, and 22 contained an unexpected traffic conflict in the form of another airplane positioned directly
on the cleared route. Pilots were instructed to be on the alert for a conflict at all times. When a conflict was discovered, the
instructions were to come to a complete stop at a safe distance from the other aircraft. The other aircraft then taxiied out of the way,
and the pilot proceeded along the cleared route. The purpose of these conflicts was to keep the pilot's attention on the outside world as
much as possible;this was desirable given that, with the exception of these occasional conflicts, no other aircraft were present in the
simulation. Data from these trials were not analyzed. This left 16 experimental trials (8 from each block) on which data was collected
and analyzed.
Within each block, half of the trials were performed under RVR 700 ft, and half under RVR 1400 ft. The two visibility levels were
simulated by the method developed by Tortes and Hoock [18], a "first-principles" calibrated fog model. However, the clarity of
objects in the out:the-window view was compromised by the update rate (30 Hz) and the resolution of the rear-projection screen
system. Hence, the actual RVR values of 700 ft and 1400 ft are likely overestimates of the visual range within which surface features
such as taxi signs could be read. In an attempt to compensate for the display quality, all surface signs in the O'Hare database were
scaled at 1.5 times actual size, to approximate realistic readability. The assignment of visibility level to trial was determined
randomly, with the constraint that half of the experimental trials in each block were performed under low visibility, and half under
moderate visibility. The same random assignment of visibility level to trial was repeated for each participant.
Following the second block of trials, all pilots completed 5 •additional trials with both the EMM and the HUD symbology provided.
In this way, every participant had some experience taxiing with both navigation aids, and could call on this experience tor evaluation
purposes.
PROCEDURE
Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the three groups (EMM, HUD, or EMM + HUD). Upon arrival, the participant
was seated in the simulation facility, and the various physical components of the simulator were explained. He then read a detailed
description of the experimental procedure. The instructions informed the participant that he would be piloting a simulated B737
through a series of gate-to-runway departure sequences. He was asked to conform as closely as possible to his normal taxi behavior
when carrying passengers but, within those constraints, to proceed as rapidly and as accurately as possible to the departure runway.
No maximum taxi speed was defined for the simulation. In the event that the pilot became lost or disoriented, he was told to fh-st try
to return to the cleared route using every means (e.g., paper map, local exploration of environment) available. If he was unable to
return to the cleared route on his own, he was told to contact "ground control" (i.e., the experimenter) for navigation instructions.
A minimum of a half hr break separated the first and second blocks of trials. At the completion of the experiment, all participants
completed a detailed questionnaire recording their opinions on various features of the two navigation displays, and responded to a
number of questions comparing the efficacy of the navigation displays.
Each trial contained the following sequence of events. The experimenter, seated at the control facility, asked the participant
whether he was ready for the next trial through the intercom. Following a "ready" acknowledgment, a written clearance was presented
in the left margin of the CRT containing the EMM (note that the clearance appeared regardless of whether the EMM itself was
present). Figure 2 shows the clearance for a route starting adjacent to Concourse F and finishing on Runway 14R. The experimenter
repeatedtheclearancev rbally,andsoliciteda"clearancer ceivedandunderstood"acknowledgmentfromthepilot.Thepilotthen
followedtheclearedroutetothedepartureunway,atwhichpointheforwardscreenwentblank.Thepilotthencompletedworkload
ratingsforthetrial(seebelow).Oncetheratingswerecompleted,theexperimenterinitiatedthenextrial.
PERFORMANCE MEASURES
Taxi performance was evaluated using a variety of empirical and subjective measures. Forward taxi speed was sampled at a rate of
2 Hz. These values were averaged to arrive at a mean taxi speed for each trial. In addition, two measures of total trial time were
calculated. One measured the elapsed time from the appearance of the clearance to the arrival at the destination runway. The other
measured from when the forward velocity of the aircraft first exceeded .5 kts to the arrival at the destination runway. Since the throttle
speed was always zero at the start of a trial, the difference between these measures gave an indication of the time taken by the pilot to
plan the route.
To evaluate route following accuracy, three "occupancy zones" were designated, each encompassing a certain region on either side
of the taxiway centerline. Zone 1 included the area 2 m on either side of centerline; Zone 2 included the area from the Zone 1
boundary to 11.2 m to either side of centerline (corresponding to the width of a standard taxiway at Chicago O'Hare); Zone 3 included
areas beyond the Zone 2 boundary. Starting with the appearance of the trial clearance, and finishing when the aircraft reached the
departure runway, the position of the aircraft was sampled at a rate of 2 Hz. Each position was coded as either Zone 1, 2, or 3. Then,
the total number of samples for each zone was converted into the total time spent in each zone (1 sample = .5 s). These values were
divided by the total trial duration (measured from the appearance of the trial clearance to the arrival of the airplane on the destination
runway), yielding the measure: proportion of total trial time that the airplane was located in each zone.
We developed the zonal approach because of concerns over the suitability of the standard accuracy metric, absolute or root mean
square deviation from centerline [8]. The absolute deviation metric assumes that ground taxi is viewed by the pilot as a tracking task,
with the goal to minimize deviations
from centerline. This assumption may well be unwarranted. Taxiways provide a relatively large paved area around the centerline,
giving pilots considerable leeway to deviate from centerline and still perform the task perfectly well. Furthermore, from the
standpoint of navigation awareness, it is unlikely that a pilot who is currently taxiing, say, 3 m from the centerline has any less
awareness of the airplane's location with respect to the cleared route than a pilot who is taxiing on the centerline.
Given these considerations, we did not classify Zone 2 occupancy as inherently poorer taxi performance than Zone 1 occupancy, as
dictated by the standard centerline deviation metric; rather, the relative amount of time spent in Zones 1 and 2 was simply takento
indicate pilot tolerance for small-to-moderate deviations from centerline. By contrast, Zone 3 occupations were expected to reflect
true navigation errors; thus, the proportion of total trial time that the airplane was occupying Zone 3 formed our primary measure of
task accuracy. These assumptions were for the most part verified by post-experimental inspection of trial performance "see below).
SUBJECTIVE PERFORMANCE MEASURES
Earlier, we mentioned that the electronic navigation aids used here not only provide information relevant to navigation, but do it in
such a way that task difficulty should be reduced [7]. To quantify this hypothesis, NASA TLX workload ratings [19] were collected
from each participant. These ratings include six constructs (mental demand, physical demand, temporal demand, performance, effort,
and frustration), each represented by a 12 point Likert scale. Following the completion of each trial, the pilot was asked to rate the
trial on all six constructs, by marking a location along the scale. The marked location was converted to a value between 0 and 11. The
values on the six constructs were then averaged, producing a single "workload" value for each trial.
Finally, each pilot completed a lengthy post-experiment questionnaire. The questionnaire gave the pilots an opportunity to evaluate
various features of the EMM and HUD symbology, and to assess their relative usefulness.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
After two pilots had completed the simulation, it was discovered that airport signage critical to one of the routes had not been
included in the visual database of Chicago O'Hare. For both pilots, the affected trial was part of the baseline block. The database was'
upgraded, and the two trials were excluded from analyses.
VISIBILITY EFFECTS
Given our interest in potential interactions between navigation aid-related performance benefits and visibility, the first step was to
determine whether the manipulation of visibility affected pilot performance. Accordingly, we took the baseline condition for all three
pilot groups and analyzed a variety of dependent measures across the two levels of visibility and the two presentation orders (baseline
blockfirstorenhancedblockfirst). Thislattervariablewasincludedto detectthepresenceof anyunwantedmaineffectsor
interactionsduetoblockorder.
Withrespectto forwardtaxispeed,pilotstaxiiedatameanvalueof 14.32ktsunderlowvisibilityand15.44ktsunderhigh
visibility.TheeffectofvisibilitywashighlyreliableF(1, 22) = 18.24, p <.01, with 21 of 24 pilots showing the effect. Neither the
main effect of block order nor the interaction of block order with visibility approached significance, both F's < 1. A similar analysis
revealed that the proportion of time spent in Zone 3 (i.e., the navigation error zone) was. 134 under low visibility, compared to .10
under moderate visibility, F(1, 22) = 4.93, p <.05. Again, no effects involving block order approached significancel And thirdly, the
mean workload rating was 6.2 for low-visibility baseline trials, compared to 5.4 for moderate visibility baseline trials. The increase in
perceived workload as visibility was reduced was highly significant, t(23) = 3.53,p < .01. In summary, when navigation aids were
limited to a paper map, taxi under low visibility was slower, more error-prone, and more demanding than taxi under moderate
visibility.
NA VIGA TION AID PERFORMANCE BENEFITS
Figure 3 shows the mean occupancy time in Zones 1, 2 and 3 as a function of visibility and condition (baseline vs. navigation aid-
enhanced). Comparing Zone 3 occupancy between baseline and navigation aid-enhanced blocks, we see that, regardless of visibility,
the presence of an advanced navigation aid virtually abolished Z. ,m 3 occupancy time. This pattern held equally for the EMM group,
the HUD group, and the EMM + HUD group, in other words, route deviations large enough to signal the likely presence of a
navigation error were almost nonexistent when either or both navigation displays were presentl These results support earlier studies
showing that an EMM improves route following accuracy [7][8]. In addition, they show that the HUD symbology was just as
effective as the EMM in improving accuracy.
The second noteworthy aspect of these results is the effect of visibility on the proportion of time spent in Zones 1 and 2. As shown
in the figure, Zone 1 occupancy was greater in low visibility than in moderate visibility, whereas Zone 2 occupancy was greater in
moderate than in low visibility. This pattern held in both the baseline condition and the navigation aid-enhanced condition, across all
three pilot groups. Clearly, pilots tolerated larger deviations from taxiway centerlines under moderate visibility than under low
visibility.
In our view, these findings confirm our earlier suspicion that, within a certain range, deviation from centerline is not an
appropriate measure of task accuracy. Compared to the low
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Figure 3: Mean proportion of total taxi time spent in Zones 1, 2, or 3 as a function of condition (baseline vs. navigation aid-
enhanced) and visibility (low vs. moderate).
visibilitycondition,themoderatevisibilityconditionproducedfastertaxispeed,reducedZone3occupancy,andlowerworkload.
Fromtheseothermetrics,it isclearthatgreaterdeviationsfromcenterline(aslongastheyarenottooextreme)canbeassociatedwith
better,notworse,taxiperformance.
Onepossibleaccountofthisbehaviorisasfollows.Supposethatinmoderateorhighvisibility,localguidancemakesuseofa
varietyof peripheralvisualcues,particularlytaxiwayedges,inadditiontothetaxiwaycenterline.Inlowvisibility,theseperipheral
cuesareeitherdegradedorlostentirely[5],forcingthepilottorelymoreonthecenterline.Theforcedrelianceoncenterlinemight
influencethepilottotreatgroundtaxiasmoreofacenterlinetrackingtask.Suchastrategywouldnaturallyieldhigheroccupancyin
Zone1(andloweroccupancyinZone2),relativetoahighervisibilitycondition.
WeexpectedintrusionsintoZone3toindicatebona-fidenavigationerrors,andthus,thatZone3occupancywouldbeasensitive
measureofroute-followingaccuracy.Toverifytheseassumptions,thepositioncoordinatesforeachtrialwererecorded,sothateach
trialcouldbeplayedbackinamoderatelyfastforwardmode.IntrusionsintoZone3occurredon111baselinetrials(58%ofthe
baselinetotal).InspectionofthesetrialsindicatedthatZone3intrusionsweretheproductof threerelativelydistinctpatterns.The
firstpatternoccurredwhenpilotstooka"shortcut"acrosstheapronarea,ordeliberatelyexecutedaverywideturninorderto
maximizethedistanceavailableontheclearedrunway.These,apparentlydeliberate,deviationsfromcenterlinedidcontaminatethe
strongestversionofouroriginalassumption,whichwasthatall intrusions into Zone 3 indicate a genuine navigation error. However,
on trials where this pattern was observed, the proportion of total trial time spent in Zone 3 was only .03, and 11 of the 24 pilots made
no intrusions of this sort at all. Thus, we can conclude that the vast majority of Zone 3 occupancy time was indeed the result of bona
fide navigation errors.
Excluding deliberate course deviations, there remained 87 trials (46% of the total) in which a Zone 3 incursion was recorded.
Some of these were characterized by the pilot failing to turn onto a cleared taxiway, or turning onto an incorrect taxiway or runway,
and then returning the aircraft to the cleared route with the first set of navigation decisions following the error. This pattern suggests
that the navigation error resulted from a lack of local navigation-related features, such as taxi signs, or insufficient attention to signage
available. However, pilots clearly retained some situation awareness regarding the relative locations of the aircraft and the cleared
route. These "local" navigation errors occurred on 52 trials (27% of the baseline trials). On the remaining 35 trials, the navigation
decisions following the initial course deviation did not return the aircraft immediately to the cleared route. This pattern suggests that
the pilot had temporarily lost all awareness of the spatial relation between his ownship position and the cleared route.
As might be expected, the time course of the two forms of error were quite different. On trials where a "local" error was
committed, the mean proportion of total trial time spent in Zone 3 was only. 16, and the average trial completion time was 7.1 min.
That is, the aircraft remained in Zone 3 for approximately 1 min. On trials where navigation awareness appeared to break down
completely, the proportion of total trial time spent in Zone 3 rises to .35, and trial completion time rises to 9.7 min. Thus, on these
trials, the aircraft strayed from the cleared route for an average of 3 min.
TAXI SPEED
Table 1 shows taxi speed as a function of condition and visibility, as well as the difference between the baseline condition and the
navigation aid-enhanced condition for the three pilot groups. The most important aspect of these results is that all three groups of
pilots taxiied more rapidly in the navigation aid-enhanced condition than in the.baseline condition. The increase in speed ranged from
1.5 kts (EMM group,, moderate visibility) to 4.5 kts (EMM + HUD group, low visibility). The mean of these speed increases was
significantly different from zero, F(I, 21) = 22.98, p <.01. In addition, while the EMM yielded a modest increase in speed at both
visibilities, the speedup due to the HUD symbology was considerably larger in low than in moderate visibility. To assess these effects
statistically, each participant's speed in the baseline condition was subtracted from his speed in the navigation-aid enhanced condition.
The resulting difference scores were then entered into an analysis of variance (ANOVA) with pilot group (Map, HUD, and EMM +
HUD) as a between-subjects variable and visibility (moderate versus low) as a within-subject variable. The ANOVA revealed a main
effect of visibility (greater benefits in low than in moderate visibility, F(1,21 = 12.69, p <.01), and a significant interaction between
group and visibility, F(I, 21 - 4.5, p <.05). An individual comparison showed that in low visibility, the 4.5 kt increase in speed for the
EMM + HUD group was significantly higher then the 1.5 kt increase in the EMM group, F(I_ 14) = 6.51,p <.05.
So far, we have established that the advanced navigation aids virtually eliminated navigation errors and increased taxi speed. One
would naturally expect that, combined, these two effects would substantially reduce trial completion time. Table 2 shows the mean
completion time for each group of pilots in each condition and visibility level. As shown in the table, the navigation aids did indeed
yield large reductions in trial completion time relative to the baseline condition; the time savings ranged from 1.9 min to 3.1 min. The
mean of these time savings was significantly higher than zero, F(1,21) = 45.87, p < .01. In addition, the time savings were larger in
low visibility than in moderate visibility, F(I, 21) = 10.87,p <.01.
Table 1. Mean Taxi Speed (kts) as a function of Pilot Group and Visibility Level
Visibility
RVR700ft RVR1400ft
Baseline 13.8 14.9
EMM 15.3 16.6
Difference 1.5 1.7
Baseline t5.5 17.3
HUD 19.4 18.9
Difference 3.9 1.6
Baseline 12.1 12.9
EMM+HUD 16.6 15.7
Difference 4.5 2.8
l'able2. MeanRouteCompletionTime(rain)asafunctionofPilotGroupandVisibilityLevel
Visibility
RVR700ft RVR1400ft
Baseline 7.8 7.2
EMM 5.9 5.2
Difference 1.9 2.0
Baseline , 7.1 5.8
HUD 4.6 4.5
Difference 2.5 1.3
Baseline 8.4 7.5
EMM + HUD 5.3 5.3
Difference 3.1 2.2
In low visibility, the 3.1 min time savings in the EMM + HUD group was noticeably larger than the 1.9 min savings in the EMM
group, although high variance in the EMM + HUD group kept the comparison from reaching statistical significance. This pattern can
be understood from the fact that for both the EMM group and the EMM + HUD group, some time savings were achieved by the
elimination 0fnavigation errors; in addition, under low visibility the EMM + HUD group achieved additional savings from the HUD-
related increase in forward taxi speed (Table 1).
PLANNING TIME
Recall that two values for route completion time were calculated, one from when the clearance was provided, the other from when
the pilot started to move the aircraft. The difference represents the time taken to plan the route before actually setting out. Once
again, it is of interest to note the impact of navigation aids on planning time, and whether the impact varied across pilot groups.
Including all 24 participants, the mean planning time in the baseline condition was 72 s. This was reduced to 35 s in the
navigation-aid enhanced conditions. All participants showed the reduction. Thus, as expected, pilots spent less time planning their
route when an advanced navigation aid was present. Table 3 shows the size of the reduction separately for each pilot group and each
visibility level. The only clear pattern in these data is that reductions in planning time in the advanced-aid condition was larger under
moderate visibility (mean = 42 s) than under low visibility (mean = 34 s); F(I, 2 I) -- 4.44, p <.05.
Thissmalleffectisneverthelessinteresting,forit is theonlyvariableinwhichthebenefitsoftheadvancednavigationaidswere
morepronouncedinmoderatevisibilitythanin lowvisibility.Inthebaselinecondition,planningtimewasslightlylongeronRVR
1400ft trials(76s)thanonRVR700ft trials(68s).Thisdifferencewaseliminatedwhenanadvancednavigationaidwasprovided.
Oneaccountofthispatternis that,inmoderatevisibility,pilotshadsomepreviewof landmarksalongthebeginningoftheroute.
Supposethisinformationwasincorporatedintothepilot's"mentalmap"oftheroute.Thisprocesswouldhavetakenasmallamount
oftime.On10w-visibilityrials,wherethelandmarkswerenotvisible,therewasobviouslynoeffortoprocessthem,soplanning
timewasreducedaccordingly.Whenanavigationaidwasprovided,weassumethatallformsof routeplanningwerereducedor
dispensed.with,therebyattenuatinganysystematiceffectsinthebaselinecondition.
Table3. Navigation-Aidrelatedreductionsinplanningtime(s)asafunctionofpilotgroupandvisibility.
Visibility
RVR700ft RVR1400ft
EMM 34 40
HUD 33 35
EMM+HUD 35 50
SUBJECTIVE MEASURES
WORKLOAD RATINGS -- Consistent with earlier analyses, workload ratings are shown separately for each group of pilots and
each visibility level in Table 4. As shown in the table, pilots rated the workload on navigation aid-enhanced trials much lower than the
workload on baseline trials; the average size of the workload reduction was 25% under low visibility and 19% under moderate
visibility. The workload difference between the navigation-aid enhanced conditions and the baseline condition was significantly
greater than zero, F(1,21) = 302.8, p <.01. In addition, the difference in the size of the workload reduction across visibility levels was
reliable F(1, 21) = 7.16, p <.02. No effects involving pilot group approached significance. We conclude from these results that both
the HUD and the EMM produced large reductions in pilot workload, and these reductions were larger under low visibility than under
moderate visibility. Compared to the workload reduction produced by each navigation aid separately, no additional reduction was
seen when the aids were jointly available.
Table 4: Workload ratings as a function of Pilot Group and Visibility
Visibility
RVR 700 ft RVR 1400 ft
Baseline 7.0 6.3
EMM 4.1 4.0
Difference 2.9 2.3
Baseline 6.3 5.2
HUD 3.2 3.2
Difference 3.1 2.0
Baseline _ .o 4.8
EMM + HUD 2.8 2.6
Difference 2.6 2.2
SUMMAR Y AND CONCL US'IONS
At present, surface operations are one of the most inefficient areas of operation in the national airspace system. Much of the
inefficiency can be traced to the inherent difficulty of the ground navigation task. However, recent simulation work has shown that
support for navigation awareness, in the form of EMM's, produce substantial improvements in ground taxi performance. The present
work investigated whether performance could be further enhanced by HUD symbology that combines limited support for navigation
awareness with explicit cues for local guidance.
The results of our simulation can be summarized as follows. Relative to the baseline condition, both the EMM and the HUD taxi
symbology yielded a substantial reduction in route completion time. This reduction can be traced to three sources. First, both displays
virtually eliminated navigation errors, even in low visibility. In the baseline condition, by contrast, navigation errors were common.
Second, both displays saved approximately half a minute in route planning time. Third, they both produced an increase in forward taxi
speed. Under low visibility, the .speed increase was much larger when the EMM was accompanied by the HUD symbology than when
it was not. Finally, complementing these empirical results, both displays produced a large reduction in the workload associated with
the ground taxi task.
In an attempt to make sense of this pattern of results, we return to the parsing of the ground taxi task into local guidance and
navigation awareness components. Previous work [1] suggests that the cognitive processes involved in maintaining navigation
awareness are highly effortful. Because they both provide route guidance information, the EMM and the HUD remove the need to
engage in these forms of processing. Thus, both aids produced similar reductions in navigation error and route planning time.
Unlike navigation awareness, local guidance is largely a set of direct feedback loops between perception and action {12], involving
little in tlae way of effortful cognitive processing. The fact that local guidance is relatively effortless may explain why the HUD did
not provide further reductions in workload, over and abovethe EMM. On the other hand, forward speed is largely controlled by visual
cues such as edge rate [20], which are supplied by the HUD symbology but not the EMM. This provides a natural explanation for why
taxi speed was more sensitive to the presence of the HUD than the EMM. As for the finding that sensitivity to the HUD symbology
increased as visibility decreased, we note that, in moderate visibility, visual cues for local guidance are available in the out-the-
window scene. Thus, providing the cues redundantly on the HUD yielded only a modest benefit, over and above the EMM alone. In
low visibility, however, the visual cues that normally control local guidance are either unavailable or severely degraded [5]. Since the
HUD was now the sole source of undegraded local guidance cues, the relative advantage of an EMM plus a HUD over an EMM alone
was greater.
This account is, of course, only tentative. In particula,', it is not clear how much of the HUD-related speed increase is actually due
to the availability of local guidance cues. The HUD symbology also supports aspects of the navigation task that skirt the boundary
between local guidance and navigation awareness [5]. For example, the virtual path provides information about the distance to the
next turn, and how rapidly the aircraft is approaching it. Pilots may well have used this information to maximize their forward speed
through long, straight sections of a route, since they know precisely how far they have to travel before slowing down. A better
understanding of the precise source of the forward speed benefit with the HUD symbology awaits further research.
PRA CTICAL IMPL1CA TIONS
The results of the present simulation suggest that adding advanced navigation aids hold the promise of substantially increasing the
efficiency of surface operations, particularly under reduced visibility conditions. In large part, this advantage is due to the fact that
these aids virtually eliminated navigation errors. In addition, the results indicate that under reduced visibility, a display thatprovides
local guidance cues can substantially increase forward taxi speed, over and above the increase found with navigation awareness
displays (i.e., an EMM). Indeed, under low visibility, the combination of few or no navigation errors and relatively high taxi speed
reduced taxi time by fully three min in the EMM + HUD group. This represents a 40% improvement over today's taxiing environment
(i.e., the baseline condition). Assuming that these benefits translate to real world operations, they are large enough to impact both
airline schedules and fuel costs significantly.
It is important to realize, however, that these benefits require both forms of navigation display. The EMM abolishes navigation
errors, but provides only a modest increase in taxi speed. The HUD yields more of a speed benefit, as well as abolishing navigation
errors, but all pilots in the simulation thought that the EMM provided a better level of situation (navigation) awareness. When given
the choice of navigating with only an EMM, only a HUD, or both, all 24 participants said they would prefer to see both displays in the
flight deck.
Finally, considering the performance benefits obtained in the present simulation, we want to point out that the EMM and the HUD
represent only a 'Tirst pass" at display design. More advanced versions of both displays are currently under development [5][11] and
will soon be augmented by a head-up auditory warning system for traffic conflicts [5]. Thus, although the benefits realized in the
present simulation are impressive, further improvements can be expected from future designs.
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